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Review-essay of Ernesto Grassi, La metafora inaudita (Palermo: 
Aesthetica edizione 1990); La preminenza della parola metaforica. 
Heidegger, Meister Eckhart, Novalis (Modena: Mucchi Editore, 1987); 
Umanesimo e retorica. Il problema della follia. (Modena: Mucchi Editore, 
1988). 
What relationship exists between metaphor-the poetic word-
and truth? Wherein lies the significance of the metaphorical word [la 
parola metaforica] in philosophical discourse? 
These questions are of central concern in three recently published 
books by Ernesto Grassi: La preminenza della parola metaforica. Heidegger, 
Meister Eckhart, Novalis, a collection of four lectures delivered by 
Grassi in Italy in 1985 and 1986; Umanesimo e retorica. Il problema della 
follia, an Italian translation of the original English text written in col-
laboration with Maristella Lorch, entitled Folly and Insanity in 
Renaissance Literature (Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval & Early 
Renaissance Studies, 1986); and La metafora inaudita, nine essays 
accompanied by an extensive bibliography of Grassi's work prepared 
by Emilio Hidalgo-Serna. All three texts promote Grassi' s urgent and 
passionate interest in the metaphor as our means to knowledge: a 
poetic response to rationalistic explanations of being and knowing. 
The dynamic relationship existing among these texts results in part of 
a formal phenomenon, i. e., the intersection and re-presentation of sev-
eral studies in La metafora inaudita which first appeared-in other 
forms and under different guises-in Umanesimo e retorica or La premi-
nenza della parola metaforica (see preface in La metafora inaudita), works 
to create a palimpsest of correspondences which, by its very nature, 
constrains us to read "through" the texts rather than treat them in an 
isolated or sequential manner. 
Traversing Grassi's texts compels the reader to take note of and 
focus upon the set of points to which the philosopher repeatedly 
returns. Characteristic, for example, is Grassi' s ongoing discussion of 
the ontological difference, the fact that Being is neither logically 
deducible from beings nor rationally identifiable (La prem., 16). "Being 
is secret and at the same time speaks" (17, my trans.): emphasis falls 
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on the contradictory nature of Being, its paradoxical essence, and on 
the assertion that Being does not abide by, is not defined by, does not 
respond to, belies the identity principle of logic (whereby A= A). For 
these reasons, Grassi sustains, "every rational metaphysics precludes 
itself from solving the problem of Being" (La prem., 28-my translation 
of "ogni metafisica razionale si preclude ogni soluzione del problema 
dell'Essere" ). 
The language of man parallels Being's own nature. Indeed, the 
problem of Being compels us to recognize the original non-rational 
character of language (16), itself defiant of the identity principle. Thus 
it is that "beings" are determined not by a logical process, but rather 
by metaphor (La prem., 41), and herein the philosophical significance 
of metaphor is revealed. "Certainly not the metaphor as a figure of 
speech" (La metafora, 9), as a mere transferral of meaning from A to B; 
certainly not an "external covering" ("integumentum") enveloping the 
truth-a tentative disguise to cloak a fixed and abstract entity-as tra-
ditional logic and rationalist thought would have it (La prem., 12). 
Metaphor is instead the paradox of "Being" and "beings," the poetic 
experience of reality as the contemporaneity of identity and difference: 
witness to and manifestation of the ontological difference. An echo in 
a canyon, its re-sounding is but an intimation of the voice of the other, 
though the voice persists unheard [inaudita], the word unpronounced 
(La metafora, 9). What remains is the profound impression of the abyss 
before us, and an unsettling yet urgent need to respond to the 
"abysmal appeal" [l' appello abissale]. The result of our experience is 
nothing less than "meraviglia" (cf. La prem., 47), and it is ingenuity 
[ingegno] that permits us to find [invenire] a way, to find ourselves in 
the situation of responding to the call (cf. Umanesimo, 26-30). 
The philosophically speculative value of the metaphorical word 
and of rhetoric in general is an assertion which openly conflicts with 
the Western rationalist tradition in philosophy, wherein the pre-emi-
nence of logic, and the equation "rationality = reality" are founding 
axioms. Historically, the metaphorical word has been afforded no 
space within these parameters, for it "has no basis in reasons ('Grund,' 
a founding chain of 'becauses'), no 'grounding' in logical truths" (cf. 
La prem., 34). It has been because of this, that metaphor, the poetic 
word, and poetry, metaphorical thought, have been limited to the field 
of literature and excluded from the realm of philosophy by thinkers 
such as Kant, Fichte, and Hegel (cf. La metafora, 97-101), among others. 
Metaphor (as it is here intended by Grassi) represents a rejection of the 
identity principle and the notion of a fixed, atemporal referentiality in 
that it manifests the "appello abissale" [Ab-grund] in an ever-changing, 
indeed "ground-breaking" manner. A "clearing" [schiarita] in the selva 
oscura, an open space which has been created by the gathering togeth-
er of what was all in a line: "this 'opening' is not obtained by means of 
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a rational process but only through metaphorical thought and lan-
guage" (Umanesimo, 117, my translation). This opening is the stage of 
the theater of the world: a space allowing the meaning of beings "to 
manifest itself through praxis" (cf. La metafora, 52), a setting "wherein 
only the metaphorical and metamorphic 'representation' of human 
history takes place" (117, my translation). It is upon this stage that 
metaphor responds to metaphysics. 
One of the major thrusts of Grassi' s efforts in these three works is 
to illustrate the philosophical significance of rhetoric vis-a-vis 
Humanism, specifically, those Humanist texts expressing a non-pla-
tonic point of view, e.g ., the writings of Salutati (De laboribus Herculis), 
Bruni (Epistolarum libri VIII et al.), Alberti (Momus) and Erasmus (The 
Praise of Folly), to name several. These are the same texts whose philo-
sophical value was discounted-precisely because of their ruptured 
ties with Platonism-both by Cartesian rationalism and German ideal-
ism, who polemically positioned themselves against any notion of a 
metaphorical philosophy. 
One central figure in contemporary philosophical thought to 
publicly reject Humanism in much the same manner as the aforemen-
tioned is Heidegger, with whom Grassi takes issue in all three of his 
books. The issue concerns the German philosopher's twofold histori-
cal thesis expressing his position on Humanism and his criticism of 
traditional metaphysics. In nuce, Humanism is considered by 
Heidegger as either an effort to "christianize" platonism and neo-pla-
tonism, or as a vain attempt at a renewed anthropology (La prem., 19). 
Based upon this, the Heideggerian position as expressed in the Letter 
on Humanism (published by Grassi for the first time in 1947), has his-
torically been to deny Humanism and Humanist writings any specula-
tive significance. Moreover, Heidegger's steadfast stance can be 
regarded within the broader context of his radical criticism of tradi-
tional metaphysics, i. e., his accusation that Western thought-from 
Plato on-has ignored the ontological difference and has therefore cre-
ated a metaphysics based on beings and not Being. It is apparent, then, 
for this reason as well that Humanism and Humanist writings fall 
within the scope of Heidegger's general criticism, and are therefore 
viewed as being part of the metaphysical tradition. 
Neither did Heidegger ever espouse the understanding or use of 
metaphor as proposed by Grassi; instead, he denied that metaphor 
possessed any philosophical function in that it was principally a vessel 
for the transferral of meaning from one term to another (La prem., 28). 
Metaphor was regarded by Heidegger as falling within the confines of 
traditional metaphysics: evidence for such an assertion could be found 
in the very fact that both "metaphor" and "metaphysics" share in com-
mon the preposition [above, beyond], which in itself "already implies 
a distinction between sensible and non-sensible, a distinction which 
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constitutes, from the very outset, the structure of traditional meta-
physics" (La prem., 30 my translation). In this way, the same platonic 
dualism born "of the distinction made between the sensible world and 
the mundus intelligibilis-quintessential to traditional metaphysics-is 
judged to be the basis for metaphor as well (La prem., 30). From this 
perspective, the role of metaphor is to call our attention and lead us to 
a truth which transcends the word, a reality beyond the "here" and 
11 now." 
Grassi passionately responds to Heidegger's historical thesis on 
all accounts. His primary rebuttal is that the German philosopher had 
never ventured an interpretation of those Humanist texts which he so 
rejected in his Letter on Humanism, thus we remain with insufficient 
proof regarding the declarations of the historical thesis (La prem., 19). 
On the other hand, Grassi takes on the challenge of close textual analy-
ses in his three books. His attention to Humanist texts is present 
throughout these writings (ostensively in Umanesimo), providing us 
with a generous and indeed compelling number of examples (among 
which the four texts mentioned earlier) that convincingly counter 
those accusations that the problem of the ontological difference had 
been ignored by the Humanists. He cites Coluccio Salutati, who in his 
De laboribus Herculis '" affirms that scientia has its origin in the 
metaphorical activity consisting of the discovery, the invention 
(inventio, in the sense of invenire) of similitudines which identify, time 
after time, the ever-changing meaning of beings" (La metafora, 19, my 
translation); he cites Leonardo Bruni, whose reflections (and transla-
tions) deal directly with the preeminence of the problem of language: 
the meaning of the word related to "context" and "situation" (its own 
historicalness), the refutation of the word as the fruit (and expression) 
of rational thought (La prem., 22). And then come Erasmus and Leon 
Battista Alberti who, in The Praise of Folly and Momus respectively, 
reveal the inadequacy of the rational process and therefore of tradi-
tional metaphysics through their own mythical philosophizing [filoso-
fare mitico ], wherein metaphorical thought and language are recog-
nized as having a primary function. It is in these two texts that we 
become aware of the fact that "the sacred fire of the gods given to men 
by Prometheus is not reason but rather metamorphic capability" 
(Umanesimo, 116, my translation). 
Grassi however does not limit himself to these texts alone, but 
rather spans the centuries examining the writings of a vast and varied 
array of other thinkers such as Aristotle, Pseudo Longinus, Meister 
Eckhart and Nikolaus Krebs, as well as "literary" figures the likes of 
Leopardi, Novalis, Nerval, and Proust. 
His consideration of the Aristotelian definition of tragedy, the 
"sublime" in Pseudo Longinus, Meister Eckhart's negative theology 
and "the ineluctable imposition of 'the word' as brought forth by 
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Nikolaus Krebs [Nicola da Cusano], supports his contention (in oppo-
sition to the Heideggerian thesis) that in both ancient and medieval 
thought there was indeed an awareness of the ontological difference, 
and that this appeared along with the ontological tradition (cf . La 
metafora, 61-75). 
Equally sensitive to the ontological difference and the pre-emi-
nence of metaphorical language is the latter group of personalities 
with whom Grassi deals. Of particular interest is Giacomo Leopardi's 
foundationless perception of reality, whereby reality ("un nulla") is 
judged to be nothing other than (vain) illusions (La metafora inaudita, 
44). There is, however, no pessimism in this Leopardi (indeed, the poet 
"polemicizes against all pessimism" [44]), for illusions (illudersi, in-
ludersi) are the key, our means for entering into and experiencing the 
ludus, the existential "game" (46). 
Novalis also speaks in terms of the "playful" [ludico] character of 
language, and of our necessity to play (action, praxis) at the game of 
language. Grassi adds, a propos of Novalis' considerations on the 
word: "Precisely because being is not attainable by means of beings' 
rational identification, it reveals itself through the historicalness of the 
game of language [del gioco della parola]" (110, my translation), that is, 
through the metaphorical word. Novalis playfully muses: "Man: a 
metaphor." (110, my translation). 
For Nerval, passion is the most powerful and urgent expression 
of the "abysmal appeal," the paradoxical experiencing of both the 
world of reality and of dreams-of identity and difference. Neither 
subjective nor psychological in nature, it is instead "the experience of a 
reality which is abysmal, mysterious" (123), and which manifests itself 
vis-a-vis the word. 
We encounter in Marcel Proust a most unlikely "philosopher" 
but, as Grassi sustains, a most resoundingly philosophical text . 
Proust's "myth" is his own passionate response to the abysmal appeal, 
"his suffering of the temporality of beings" and his questioning of 
whether one can arrive at a more profound reality not, however, by 
transcending the moment, but rather by urgently adhering to the 
"here" and "now," through the metaphorical word (78-79). 
In order to realize this task Proust writes a phenomenology, he describes 
an existential experience, not in the manner of Hegel, by illustrating the 
dialectic process of rational thought, but rather by shedding light upon 
the original abysmal character of reality, which [ .. . ], thanks to the poet-
ic word, makes man appear in all of his historicalness . (78, my transla-
tion) 
We now arrive at our point of departure, which is best summed 
up by Ernesto Grassi' s own questioning: "Here is the problem: does 
the recognition of the lack of pre-eminence of the rational word permit 
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[us] to speak of the legitimacy and philosophical function of the 
metaphorical word?" (La prem., 27, my translation). Put differently: do 
these texts convincingly present metaphor's response to metaphysics? 
Grassi' s presentation and discussion of the ontological differ-
ence, of the impossibility to arrive at Being through beings, i.e., by 
means of logical deduction, is compelling. The philosopher develops 
and argues his point rigorously, taking care to consider and examine 
both sides of the question through his own analyses of texts represent-
ing the metaphysical tradition (Kant, Fichte, and Hegel in particular) 
as well as those which speak for the "metaphorical tradition." 
Furthermore, the abundance of textual evidence cited also serves 
to powerfully rebut Heidegger's historical claim that from Plato on, 
the Western philosophical tradition has ignored the problem of the 
ontological difference. Indeed, by demonstrating the philosophical 
worth of so many texts which had previously been "relegated" to the 
field of "literature," Grassi creates a philosophical counter-canon, call-
ing into question the very definition of "philosophy," and the criteria 
by which a text is judged to be either "in" or "out." 
In these three texts the philosopher is both explicit and painstak-
ingly thorough in his exposition on the nature of the metaphor (para-
dox, "the logic of identity and difference") as the expression and mani-
festation of beings' participation in Being. The most intriguing 
development in Grassi's thinking on metaphor is expressed in La 
metafora inaudita, and concerns all that is suggested in the title, namely, 
the fact that the metaphor for which we search, that "sublime" word 
which will capture Being, "a word capable of offering a definite 
response to our every question" (La metafora, 9-10) is unheard of, never 
pronounced. The outrageous [inaudito] silence of a metaphor which is 
forever displaced, "subject" of an incessant trans-lation [traslazione 
incessante ], is both the sense and the es-sence of the paradox of Being 
and beings. 
There is one unsettling problem which arises upon reading these 
texts for the first time, and that is to question Grassi's apparent objec-
tive to establish the preeminence of the metaphorical word (as the title 
of one work suggests) over the rational word: is not this urgency for 
the former to "take its rightful place" by overcoming the latter merely 
an exchange of vessels? Does the philosopher fall into the trap of 
desiring to "change places" with the dominant philosophical tradi-
tion? 
One could suggest that there are textual indicators to this effect, 
citing, for instance, Grassi's style, which recalls a mode of presentation 
typical of the traditional Western philosophical treatise (chapters, 
numbered paragraphs, analytical organization and disposition). Or, 
one might object that Grassi' s lexicon ( e. g., "contradiction," 
"object/ subject," "new objectivity," "priority," "origin"), particularly 
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in the two earlier works, is better suited and traditionally a part of the 
lexicon of logic and rationalist thought. These details do indeed catch 
the reader's eye at the outset. 
Grassi's texts, however, ask to be read and re-read. And the more 
they are read and read again, the less "apparent" the question of 
"trading places" becomes. To emphasize the pre-eminence of the 
metaphorical word is not equal to the insistence upon the priority of 
the rational word, precisely because the metaphor is "inaudita," con-
stantly displaced thus ever-changing, rhetorical. Hence what appears 
to be identical is but an intimation of identity and difference. 
